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Summary– We say that an encryption scheme or asignature scheme provides anonymity
when it is infeasible to determine which user generated aciphertext or asignature. To can
struct the schemes with anonymity, it is necessary that the space of ciphertexts or signatures
is common to each user. In this paper, we focus on the techniques which can be used to
obtain this anonymity property, and propose anew technique for obtaini$\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ the anonymity
property on RSA-based cryptosystem, which we call “sampling $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}.’\dot{\mathrm{J}}$ It generated the uni-
form distribution over $[0, 2^{\mathrm{h}})$ by sampling the two elements from $E_{N}$ $\mathrm{w}$ here $|N1$ $=k$ . Then, by
applying the sampling twice technique, we construct the schemes for encryption, undeniable
and confirmer signature, and ring signature, which have some advantages to the previous
schemes.




We say that an encryption scheme or asignature
scheme provides anonymity when it is $\inf_{\mathrm{f}\exists}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{b}1\mathrm{e}$ to
determine which user generated aciphertext or a
signature. Asimple observation that seems to be
folklore is that standard RSA encryption, namely,
aciphertext is $x^{\mathrm{e}}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d} N$ where $x$ is aplaintext
and { $N$, $e)$ is apublic key, does not provide an0-
nymity, even when all moduli in the system have
the same length. Suppose an adversary knows that
the ciphertext $y$ is created under one of two keys
(No, $e_{0}$ ) or $(N_{1\mathrm{I}}e_{1})$ , and suppose $N_{0}\leq N_{1}$ . If
$y$ $\geq N_{0}$ then the adversary bets it was created un-
der $(N_{1}, e_{1})$ , else the adversary bets it was created
under $(N_{0}, e_{\zeta\}})$ . It is not hard to see that this at-
tack has non-negligible advantage. To construct
the schemes with anonymity, it is necessary that
the sPaice of ciphertexts is common to each user.
We can say the same thing about RSA-based sig-
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nature schemes.
Bellare, Boldyreva, Desai, and Pointcheval [1]
proposed anew security requirement of the en-
cryption schemes called “key-privacy” or ffanonym-
ity ’ $\mathrm{f}$ It asks that the encryption provide (in addi-
tion to privacy of the data being encrypted) pri-
vacy of the key under which the encryption was
performed. In [1], they provided the key-privacy
encryption scheme, RSA-RAEP, which is avariant
of RSA-OAEP, and made the space of ciphertexts
common to each user by repeating the evaluation
of the RSA-OAEP permutation $f(x, r)$ with plain-
text $x$ and random $r_{1}$ each time using different $\mathrm{r}$
until the value is in the safe range. For deriving a
value in the safe $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}_{1}$ the number of the repeti-
tion would bs very large (the value of the security
parameter). to fact, their algorithm can fail to give
adesired output with some (small) probability.
Chaum and Antwerpen provided undeniable sig-
nature which cannot be verified without the signer ’s
cooperation. The validity or invalidity of an unde-
niable signature can be ascertained by conducting
aprotocol with the signer, assuming the signer
participates. Chaum provided confirmer signature
which is undeniable signature where signatures may
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Figure 1: The previous and our proposed schemes
also be verified by interacting with an entity called
the confirmer who has been designated by the signer.
GGalbraith and Mao proposed anew security n0-
thon for undeniable and confirmer signature named
“anonymity” in [5]. We say that an undeniable
or confirmer signature scheme provides anonymity
when it is infeasible to determine which user gener-
ated the message-signature pair. In [5], Galbraith
and Mao provided the undeniable and confirmer
signature scheme with anonymity. They made the
space of signatures common to each user by apply-
ing astandard RSA permutation to the signature
and expanding it to the common domain $[0, 2^{2k})$
where $N$ is apublic key for each user and $|N|$ $=k$ .
This technique was proposed by Desmedt [3].
Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman [8] proposed the
notion of ring signature, which allows amember
of an $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{d}$ hoc collection of users $1\mathrm{S}$ to prove that a
message is authenticated by amember of $\mathrm{E}$ with
out revealing which member actually produced the
signature. Unlike group signature, ring signature
has no group managers, no setup procedures, $11\mathrm{O}$
revocation procedures, and no coordination. The
signer does not need the knowledge, consent, or as-
sistance of the other ring members to put them in
the ring. All the signer needs is knowledge of their
regular public keys. They also proposed the effi-
cient schemes based on RSA and Rabin. In their
RSA-based sche me, the trap-door RSA permuta-
tions of the various ring members will have ranges
of different sizes. This makes it awkward to com-
bine the individual signatures, so one should con-
struct some trap door one-way permutation which
has acommon range for each user. Intuitively,
in the ring signature scheme, Rivest, Shanlir, and
Tauman solved this problem by encoding the mes-
sage to an $N_{\mathrm{B}}$-ary representation and aPPlying a
standard RSA permutation $f$ to the low-0rder dig-
its where $N_{\mathrm{i}}$ is apublic key for each user. This
technique is considered to be essentially the same
as that by Desmedt. As mentioned in [8], for deriv-
ing asecure permutation $g$ with acommon range,
the range of $g$ would be 160 bits larger than that
of $f$ .
Hayashi, Okamoto, and Tanaka $[\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}]$ recently pr0-
posed the RSA family of trap-door permutations
with acommon domain denoted by RSACD. They
showed that the $\theta$-partial one-wayness of RSACD
is equivalent to the one-wayness of RSACD for $\theta$ $>$
$0.5$ , and that the one wayness of RSACD is equiv-
alent to the one-wayness of RSA which is the stan-
dard RSA family of trap-door permutations. They
also proposed the applications of RSACD to en-
cryption and ring signature schemes. Their schemes
have some advantages to the previous schemes.
1.2 Our Contribution
In this paper, we focus on the techniques which
can bfi used to obtain the anonymity property.
From the previous results mentioned above, we
can find three techniques, repeating, expanding,
and using RSACD, for anonymity of cryptosys-
tems based on RSA
Repeating Repeating the evaluation of the en-
cryption (respectively the signing) with plain-
text $\Pi \mathrm{j}$ (resp. message $m$ ), random $r$ , and the
RSA function, each time using different $r$ un-
til the value is smaller than any public key
$N$ of each user.
Bellare, Boldyreva, Desai, and Pointcheval
used this technique for encryption scheme [1].
Expanding Doing the evaluation of the encryp-
tion (respectively the signing) with plaintext
$x$ (resp. message $m$ ), random $r$ , and the RSA
function, and expanding it to the common
domain.
This technique was proposed by Desmedt [3].
In [5], Galbraith and $\mathrm{h}/\mathrm{I}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{o}$ used this tech-
nique for the undeniable signature scheme.
In [8], Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman also used
this technique for the ring signature scheme.
RSACD Doing the evaluation of the encryption
(respectively the signing) with plaintext $\mathrm{f}E$
(resp. message $m$ ), rando$\mathrm{m}r$ , and the RSACD
function.
In [6 ] Hayashi, Okamoto, and Tanaka pr0-
posed the RSACD function and applications
of this function.
In this paper, we propose anew technique for
obtaining the anonymity property of RSA-b find
cryptosystems. We call this technique “sampling
twice.” In our technique, we employ an algorithm
ChooseAndShift. It takes two numbers $x_{1}$ , f2 $\in$
ee
$E_{N}$ as input ancf returns avalue $y$ $\in[0, 2^{I_{\mathrm{u}}^{\alpha}})$ where
$|N|$ $=k$ , and if $\mathrm{z}_{1}$. and r2 are independently and
uniformly chosen from $E_{N}$ then $y$ is uniformly dis-
tributed over $[0_{1}2^{k})$ .
Sampling Twice Doing the evaluation of the en-
cryption (respectively the signing) twice with
plaintext $x$ (resp. message $m$ ), random $r_{1}$
and $r_{2}$ , and the RSA function, and applying
our proposed algorith$\mathrm{m}$ ChooseAndShif for
the two resulting values.
Then, by applying the sampling twice technique,
we construct the schemes for encryption, undeni-
abIe and confirmer signature, and ring signature
(See Figure 1.).
We summarize the $(\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s})\mathrm{a}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}$ of our pr0-
posed schemes.
Our proposed encryption scheme with sampling
twice is efficient with respect to the size of cipher-
texts and the decryption cost. It is also efficient
with respect to the encryption cost in the worst
case. On the other hand, that in the average case
is larger than those of the previous schemes. More
precisely, in our encryption scheme, the number of
modular exponentiations to encrypt in the average
case is 2, while those in the previous schemes are
1or 1.5.
Our proposed undeniable and confirmer signa-
ture scheme with sampling twice is efficient with
respect to the size of signatures. On the other
hand, the number of modular exponentiations for
signing and that of computation of square roots
are always 2, while those of the other schemes are
1or 1.5 in the average case.
Our proposed ring signature scheme with sam-
pling twice is efficient with respect to the size of
signatures and the verification cost. On the other
hand, tite signing cost of our scheme is larger than
those of the previous schemes in the average case.
If we use the RSACD function, the resulting
value is calculated by applying the RSA function
either once or twice. Fortunately, since applying
the RSA function twice does not reduce security,
we can prove that the RSACD function is one-w ay
if the RSA function is one-way. Generally speak-
$\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}\}$ aone-way function does not always have this
property, and we cannot construct aone-way func-
tion with acommon domain.
On the other hand, in the sampling twice, re-
peating, and expanding techniques, the resulting
value is calculated by applying the RSA function
once. Therefore, it might be possible to apply
these techniques to other one-way functions and
prove the security of the resulting schemes.
The organization of this paper is $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{L}\mathrm{S}$ follows. In
Section 2, we review the definitions concerning
families of functions arid the standard RSA family.
$\mathrm{t}^{\mathrm{F}_{\mathfrak{l}}\Gamma}\mathrm{e}$ construct the $\mathrm{a}1\mathrm{g}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}_{\mathrm{l}}\mathrm{n}$ ChooseAndShif and
propose the sampling twice technique in Section 3.
In Section 4, we propose the encryption schemes
with anonymity. We conclude in Section 5.
Due to lack of space, details have been omitted
from this paper. See the full version [7].
2Preliminaries
We describe the definitions of families of func-
tions, falllilies of trap-door permutations, and $\theta-$
partial one-way.
Definition 1(families of functions, families of
trap-door permutations). $t1$ family of$f JT?,r_{P}tion\epsilon F$ $=$
$(K, \mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{I}}E)$ is specified by three algorithms. The ran-
domzzgd $\# jey-jje^{l}nernti\mathrm{f}\mathit{3}n$ algorithm $KtaL^{n}\epsilon i\mathit{5}$ as input
a lFecurzty parameter $k$ and returns $ai$ pair $(pk_{\mathrm{I}}sk)$
where $pk$ $L\mathrm{B}$ $a$ $T^{\mathit{1}u?l\tau c}\mathrm{j}$ key and sk is an associated
secret key (In cases where the family is not trap-
door, $\mathrm{f}f\iota e\mathit{5}ELT\ddagger\exists t$ key is simply the $\mathbb{E}irn\beta \mathit{3}ty$ streng).
The $raad_{i}om\iota zed$ snmpfrng algorithm 3takes $ph^{A}$
and retum.s $a\mathrm{i}$ random point in a set thai $?\mathit{1}\prime t_{d}^{3}$ call the
larger $m$ of the function and denote by $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{F}(pk)$ .
The dete rministic evaluation algorithm $Eta\mathrm{i}k\epsilon \mathrm{i}S$ $p\mathrm{f}^{\mathrm{B}}$.
and $x$ $\in \mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{F}(pk)$ and returns an output $w\epsilon \mathrm{i}$ de-
note by $E_{\mathrm{p}h}(x$ }. We let $\mathrm{R}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}_{F}(pk)$ $=\{E_{\mathrm{p}k}(x)$ $|x$ $\in$
$\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{F}(pk)\}de\mathrm{r}\mathrm{L}\mathrm{f}3te$ the range of the function.
We say that $F$ is a family of trap-de$\Pi \mathrm{f}^{-}$ permuta-
tvons if Domp (pk) $=\mathrm{R}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{F}(\mathrm{p}\mathrm{k})$ $E_{\mathrm{p}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{i}}}$ is $a\mathrm{i}$ bvyection
on fhzs set, and there exists a dete rministic $\mathrm{z}n?\mathrm{P},\Gamma-$
sion algorithm I that takes $sk$ and $[\mathit{1}\in \mathrm{R}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}_{F}(pk)$
and $r\mathrm{f}\exists tu\mathrm{r}\tau \mathrm{L}\mathrm{B}$ $\mathrm{T}\in \mathrm{D}o\mathrm{m}_{F}(pk)$ such that $E\mathrm{j}_{ph}(x)$ $=y$ .
Definition 2($\theta$-partial one-way). Let $F$ $=(K_{1}1\mathrm{S}_{7}E)$
be a $f_{\mathrm{f}1}.mily$ of $func\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{f}\mathrm{J}\mathrm{T}1\mathrm{I}}\mathrm{p}$ . Let $b$ $\in\{0,1\}$ and $k$ $\in \mathrm{I}\mathrm{f}1$ .
Let $\mathrm{f}l<\theta$ $\leq 1$ be $a\mathrm{i}$ constant. Let $A$ be an adver-
sa$\prime ry$ . Wc consder the following expet rrucnts:
Experiment $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}_{F_{\mathrm{I}}}^{\theta- \mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}- \mathrm{f}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}}(k)$
$(pk_{1}sk)$ $arrow K(k)\cdot$ $x$ $arrow$ DomF(pk)
$R$
. $y$ $arrow E_{\mathrm{p}k}(x)$
$x_{1}.arrow$ {$pk,$ $y)$ where $|x_{1}|=[\theta\cdot|x|\rceil$
if ( $E_{pk}(x_{1}||x_{2})=y\mathrm{f}$or some $\Pi \mathrm{i}_{2}$ ) return 1
else returns 0
We say that the family $F$ is $\theta$ -parlza.lone-way if
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}_{F_{1}A}^{\theta- \mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\cdot \mathrm{f}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}}(k) =1]$
$\mathrm{B}\mathrm{B}$ $n\mathrm{i}egl\mathrm{z}g\mathrm{z}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t}\exists$ for any adversary A whose time com-
$pl_{\mathrm{E}iE1}\mathrm{B}y$ zs polynomial en $k$ .
The time-complexity” is the worst case execution
time of the experiment plus the size of the code of
the adversary, in some fixed RAM model of com-
putation.
Note that when $\theta$ $=1$ the notion of $\theta$-partial
one-w ayness coincides with the standard notion of
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one-waiyneBi5. We say thait the family $F$ is one-way
when $F$ is 1-partial one-way.
We describe the standard RSA family of trap-
door permutations denoted by RSA.
Definition 3(the standard RSA $\mathrm{f}$ amily of trap-
door permutations). The standard $R_{\mathrm{I}}FA$ $f\mathrm{r}\mathrm{A}\tau \mathrm{n}\mathrm{z}\mathrm{J}\mathrm{t}$] of
trap-door $p\epsilon irmutatzon\mathit{5}$ RSA $=(H_{\mathrm{J}}1\mathrm{F}_{1}E)$ is as fol-
lows. The key generation aBgorithrn takes as input
$a\mathrm{i}$ security $paramet\not\in\exists r$ $k$ and picks $ra\mathrm{i}\tau\iota d\mathrm{o}\Pi \mathrm{L}$, dasfincf
primes $p$ , $q$ $\mathrm{B}^{I}\Pi$ the $r\iota bng\sigma\exists$ $2^{\mathrm{f}k/2\rceil-1}.<p$ , $q$ $<2^{\lceil k/2\rceil}$
$aa^{l}\Gamma td$ $2^{k-1}<P{}^{t}J<$ $2^{h}$ . It sets $N$ $=pq$ $amf$ picks
$e_{7}d\in E_{\phi\{N]}^{*}$ such that $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{i}d$ $=1$ (mod $\phi(N)$ ) $\mathrm{u}1h\epsilon \mathrm{i}\mathrm{T}\mathrm{E}$
$\phi(N)=(p-1)(q-1)$ . The public $\mathrm{L}^{\mathrm{B}}ey$ is $N_{\mathrm{J}}e_{1}L^{n}$ and
the secret key zs $N$ , $d_{\mathrm{J}}k$ . The sets $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{R}5\mathrm{A}}\{N_{1}e$, $h^{\mathrm{u}})$
and Rngssx $(N_{?}e, k)$ are both equal to $E_{N}^{*}$ . The
$e^{\mathrm{r}}\mathrm{u}a\mathrm{f}uaaat?on$ algor ifhm $E_{N,\mathrm{e}_{!}\mathrm{b}}(x)$ $=x^{\mathrm{E}}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d} N$ and
the $in?l\mathrm{t}\exists rs\mathrm{z}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{L}$ algorithm $I_{N,\mathrm{d},\mathrm{E}}(y)=y^{\mathrm{d}}$ mod N. $Th\in i$
sampling algorithm $rr^{\supset}turnB$ $a\mathrm{i}$ raiTLdom point in $E_{N}^{*}$ .
In [4], Fujisaki, Okamoto, Pointcheval, and Stern
showed that the $\theta$-partial one-wayness of RSA is
equivalent to the one-wayness of RSA for $\theta>0.5$ ,
3The Sampling Twice Technique
In this section, we propose anew technique for
obtaining the anonymity property of RSA-based
cryptosystems. We call this technique “sampling
twice.” In our technique, we employ the algorithm
ChooseAndShift. It takes two numberEi $x_{1}$ , $x_{2}\in$
$E_{N}$ as input and returns avalue $\mathrm{t}p$ $\in[0, 2^{k})$ where
$|N|$ $=k$ .
Algorithm $\mathrm{C}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{A}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t}_{N,k}$ $(x_{1}, \Pi \mathrm{i}_{2})$
if $\langle 0\leq x_{1},$ $x_{2}<$ $2^{\mathrm{A}arrow}-N)$
return $\{$
elseif $(2^{\mathrm{b}}$
$x_{1}$ with prob. $\frac{1}{2}$
$\mathrm{T}_{1}+N$ with prob. $\frac{1}{2}$









$\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{b}.\cdot$ $(+ \frac{2^{k+1}N}{2^{k+\mathrm{I}}})(\frac{1}{\frac{21}{2}}+\frac{N}{})\mathrm{x}\mathrm{x}$ $\frac{}{2}\frac{1}{2,1’}$
$y_{2}$ with prob. $\frac{3}{\mathrm{Z}}-\overline{2}^{\Gamma+\overline{1}}.N$
Note thait $2^{k-1}<N<$ $2^{\mathrm{k}}$ ensures $2^{k}-N$ $<N_{\dagger}$
$0< \frac{1}{2}-\overline{\mathrm{z}}^{N}\varpi<$ $1$ , and $0< \frac{1}{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{i}}+_{\mathrm{g}}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}_{\overline{+1}}^{N}<1$ In order to
run this algorithm, it is sufficient to prepare only
$k$ $+3$ random bits.
We prove the following theorem on the property
of ChooseAndShift.
Theorem 1. If $x_{1}$ anti $x_{2}$ are independently and
uniformly chosen from’ $E_{N}$ then the $tJ?AtptLt$ of the
above $afgo\coprod thm$ is uniformly $d\mathrm{i}st\coprod \mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{J}}\mathrm{u}ted$ over $[0, 2^{k})$ .
Proof. To prove this theorem, we show that if $\mathrm{n}_{1}^{\tau}$
and $\Pi \mathrm{j}2$ are independently and uniformly chosen
from $E_{N}$ then $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[\mathrm{C}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{A}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t}_{N_{\mathrm{i}}\mathrm{L}}.(\mathrm{z}_{1\}}.x_{2})=$
$\sim \mathrm{F}]$ $=1/2^{\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{i}}}$ for any $\underline{T}\in[0_{\mathrm{I}}2^{k}$ ). For any $\sim \mathrm{y}$ $\in[0_{1}\underline{7}^{k}-$
$N)$ , we have
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[\mathrm{C}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{A}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t}N_{\eta}k (\Pi \mathrm{i}1_{\mathrm{J}}\mathbb{Z}\mathrm{z}) =E]$
$=\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}:1=\underline{\mathrm{P}}\wedge 0\leq x\mathrm{z}< 2^{h}-N]\mathrm{x}$ $\frac{1}{2}$
$+\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[(x_{1}=\mathrm{z}\Lambda 2^{k}-N \leq x_{2}<N)$ $\mathrm{V}$
$(x_{\mathrm{z}=}E\Lambda 2^{k}-N \leq\tau_{I1}< N)]$
$\mathrm{x}$ $( \frac{1}{2}+\frac{N}{2^{k+1}})\mathrm{x}$ $\frac{1}{\mathrm{Z}}$
$= \frac{2^{\mathrm{k}}-N}{N^{\mathrm{B}}}\mathrm{x}$ $\frac{1}{2}+\frac{2N-2^{\mathrm{b}}}{N^{\underline{\gamma}}}\mathrm{x}2\mathrm{x}$ $( \frac{1}{2}+\frac{N}{2^{\mathrm{L}*+1}})\mathrm{x}$ $\frac{1}{2}$
$= \frac{1}{2^{\mathrm{k}}}$ .
It is clear that $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[\mathrm{C}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{A}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t}_{N,k}(x_{1}, x_{2})=$
$E:]/=\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[\mathrm{C}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{A}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t}N_{1}k(x_{11}x_{\mathrm{z}})=\underline{\tau}’+N]$for
any $\underline{\nu}’\in[0, 2^{k}-N)$ . Therefore, for any $\underline{\mathrm{P}}\in[N, 2^{k})_{\mathrm{r}}$
we have $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[\mathrm{C}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{A}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t}_{N,\mathrm{h}}(x_{11}x_{2})=\underline{7}]=$
$1/2^{h}$ .
Furthermore, for any $E$ $\in[2^{k_{\mathrm{i}}}-N_{\mathrm{I}}N$ ), we have
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[\mathrm{C}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{A}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t}N,l_{\mathrm{i}}(x_{1\mathrm{l}}x_{2})=z]$
$=\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[x_{1}=\sim r\Lambda 2^{k}-N \leq x_{2}<N]$
$+\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[(x_{1}=\mathrm{z}\Lambda 0\leq x_{2}< 2^{k}-N)$ $\vee$
$(x_{2}=\sim\Psi\Lambda \mathrm{G} \leq x_{1}< 2^{h}-N)]\mathrm{x}$ $( \frac{1}{2}-\frac{N}{2^{\mathrm{L}+1}})$
$= \frac{2N-2^{\mathrm{b}}}{N^{2}}+\frac{2^{k}-}{N}\mathrm{D}N\mathrm{x}2\mathrm{x}$ $( \frac{1}{2}-\frac{N}{2^{k+1}})=\frac{1}{2^{\mathrm{L}}}$
$\square$
By using the algorithm ChooseAndShift, we Pro-
pose anew technique for obtaining the anonymity
property. We call this technique “sampling twice.”
Sampling Twice Doing the evaluation of the en-
cryption (respectively the signing) twice with
plaintext $ff\mathrm{j}$ (resp. message $m$), random $r_{1}$
and $r_{2}$ , and the RSA function, and applying
our proposed algorithm Choo $\mathrm{s}$eAndShift for
the two resulting values.
4Encryption
4.1 Definitions
Bellare, Boldyreva, Desai; and Pointcheval [1]
proposed anew security requirement of encryp-
tion schemes called “key-privacy” or anonymity ”
It asks that the encryption provide (in addition
to privacy of the data being encrypted) privacy
of the key under which the encryption was per-
formed. In [1], apublic-key encryption scheme
with common-key generation is described as fol-
lows.
Definition 4. A public-key $encr\tau/ptl\mathrm{f}Jn$ $sch\xi ime$ with
$co\Pi Lmon$-key generation $\mathcal{P}\Xi=(\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, D)c\zeta \mathrm{I}nsszstg$
of four algorithms. The common-key generation
algorithm $\mathcal{G}$ takes as input $ai$ security parameter $k$
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and returns some $com\tau \mathrm{n}\mathrm{f}$ } $\eta$ key I. Tftje key gener-
tltzon algorithm $\kappa$ is $\mathrm{f}L$ randomized $a$]$grJrzEhm$ that
takes as input $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{L}$ common key I and returns $ai$ pair
$(pk, sk)$ of $k_{\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}}ys_{f}$ a public key and $a\mathrm{i}$ matching secret
key. The encryption ailgorzthm $E$ ts $\zeta \mathrm{g}$ randomized
algorithm that takes the public key $pkj$ and a plaiin-
Le$\mathrm{J}’$if $x$ to return a ciphertext $y$ . The $decrj$]$pt^{J}\dot{\iota}ti\tau 1$ [At-
gorvtlrm $I\Pi$ is $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}$ deterministic algoritlrm fhfi5 takes
the secret key $Ek$ and fi ciphertext $y$ to return th$e$
$cor\Gamma esIJond.ing$ $pl\Pi\dot{z}ntextx$ or $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{J}$ special symbol 1to
indicate that the ciphertext was invalid.
In [1], they formalized the property of fLkey-
privacy.” This can be considered under either the
whose -plaintext attack or the chosen-ciphertext
attack, yielding two notions of security, IK-CPA
and IK-CCA. (IK means “indistinguishability of
keys 1)
Definition 5(IK-GPA, IK-CCA [1]). Let $\mathcal{P}\Xi=(\mathcal{G}_{1}$
$K\mathrm{i}_{7}E_{1}D)$ be an encryption schem$\mathrm{r}\iota e$ . Let $b$ $\in\{0,1\}$
aind $k$ $\in$ E. Let $f[_{\mathrm{c}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}}=(A_{\mathrm{c}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}}^{1}, A_{\mathrm{c}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}}^{2})f$ $A_{\mathrm{c}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}}=$
$(A_{\mathrm{c}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}}^{1}, A_{\mathrm{c}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}}^{\mathrm{H}})$ be $ad^{l}u\iota\exists rsartes$ thof run in two stages
and where $\mathrm{r}4_{\mathrm{c}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}}$ has access to the oracles $D_{\Leftrightarrow k_{0}}(\cdot)$
and $D_{Bk_{1}}$ ( $\cdot$ ). Note that si is the state infomation.
It contains $pk_{\mathrm{f}\mathrm{J}}$ , $pk_{1_{\theta}}$ and so on. For atk $\in\{\mathrm{c}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}$ ,
$\mathrm{c}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\}$ , $w\mathfrak{x}\exists$ consider the following experfmentB:
Experiment $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}_{\mathcal{P}E,A_{\mathrm{d}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}}}^{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{k}- \mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}- \mathrm{b}}(k)$
$I$ $arrow \mathcal{G}(k)\mathrm{j}(pk_{0_{1}}sk_{0})arrow \mathcal{K}(I)\dot{l}.(pk_{11}sk_{1})arrow \mathcal{K}(I)$
$(\mathbb{J}_{1}5\mathrm{i})$ $\mapsto A_{\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}}^{1}(pk_{\mathrm{I}\mathrm{J},\mathrm{I}^{1}}k_{1})_{\mathrm{j}}$
$y*-E_{pk_{\mathrm{b}}}\{x)_{j}$
$d\mapsto A_{\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}}^{2}$ ( $y$ , si)
return $d$
Above it is mandated that $A_{\mathrm{c}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}}^{2}$ never $qu\epsilon\tau es$ tfLE
$cf\mathrm{t}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{t}Il\epsilon inge$ ciphertext $y$ to $\mathrm{l}\exists ith\mathrm{f}iT$ $D_{\mathrm{s}k_{\mathrm{D}}}(\cdot)$ or $D_{Bk_{1}}(\cdot)$ .
For $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}\in\{\mathrm{c}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}, \mathrm{c}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\}\mathrm{J}$ we define ffiE $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}d\mathrm{v}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{J}7\mathrm{L}$tages via
$\mathrm{A}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{v}_{\mathrm{P}EA_{\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}}}^{1\mathrm{k}- \mathrm{a}\mathrm{L}\mathrm{k}}(k)$ $=$
$|\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{P}E_{!}A_{\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}}}^{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{k}- \mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}- 1}(k) =1]$ $-\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}[\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}_{7^{\mathrm{I}}E,A_{\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}}}^{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{k}- \mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{k}- 0}(k) =1]|$
The scheme $\mathrm{P}E$ is said to be IK-CPA secure $\zeta re-$
spectvvely IK-CCA secttse) $\mathrm{t}f$ $\mathrm{A}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{v}_{\mathrm{P}E,A_{\Gamma \mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}}}^{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{k}- \mathrm{c}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}}(\cdot)$ (resp,
$\mathrm{A}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{v}_{\mathrm{P}E_{\mathrm{J}}A_{\mathrm{c}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}}}^{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{k}- \mathrm{c}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}}(\cdot)j$ is $n\epsilon:glzij\iota.bl\epsilon i$ for any $ttd^{\prime uG\Gamma \mathit{5}\iota L\mathit{1}}\cdot y$ $A$
whose time complexity $\mathrm{z}s$ polynomial in $k$
4.2 Encryption with Sampling Twice
In this section, we propose the encryption sche me
with the sampling twice technique.
Definition 6. The common-key generation algO-
$rith\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\iota \mathcal{G}$ takes $a\mathrm{i}$ security parameter $k$ and returns
$paraimef,\not\in iTS$ $k$ , $k_{0_{\mathrm{J}}}$ $aad$ $k_{1}$ such that $k_{\{\}}(k)$ $+k_{1}(k)<$
$k$ for all $k>1$ . This defines an associated plaiintexf-
length function $n(k)$ $=k$ $-\mathrm{A}_{0}^{n}(k)$ $-k_{1}(k)-$ The
key generntzon algontlh$m$ $\mathcal{K}$ takes $k$ , $k_{0\}}k_{1}$ , runs the
$L_{G}^{\wedge}$
$]$l-i]P,nP\Gamma fI.tittPJ, $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}go\mathrm{T}\mathrm{B}t,hm$ of RSA, and gets $N_{1}\xi\exists_{1}d$
The public key $pL^{R}\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{L}}\mathrm{q}(N_{1}e)$ , $k_{\mathrm{E}}k_{01}.h_{1}nnd/,he$ secret
key $sk$ is $(N, d)$ , $k^{\#}$ , $k_{\mathrm{I}\mathrm{J}3}k_{1}$ , $I^{\urcorner}he$ other algorithms are
$d\not\in\exists pict\mathrm{g}_{i}d$ below Let $G$ $\cdot$ $\{0, 1\}^{k_{0}}arrow\{0_{3}1\}^{71+h_{1}}$.and
$H$ : $\{0, 1\}^{J1+\mathrm{k}_{1}}arrow\{0,1\}^{L_{0}}$ be hash functions. Note
that $[x]^{?1}$ denotes the $n$ most siEmficfInt bits of $\Pi \mathrm{j}$
ant $[x]_{\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}1}$ denrJtes $t\mathrm{h}\epsilon \mathrm{i}$ $m$ $le\iota Lbt$ significant bits of $\Pi \mathrm{j}$
Note that thLE valid $ciph\epsilon \mathrm{i}rte;\mathrm{L}ty$ saftsfies $y$ $\in[0,2^{\mathrm{L}})$




$151\not\in-(x||0^{k_{1}})\oplus G(r_{1})\mathrm{i}$ $\mathrm{f}_{1}.-r_{1}\in\exists\exists H(\mathrm{s}_{1})$
$v_{1}arrow(_{51}\mathrm{I}||\mathrm{t}_{1})^{\Xi}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d} N$
$s_{2}arrow(x||0^{L_{1}})\oplus G(\tau_{2})_{\mathrm{i}}$ $\mathrm{f}_{2}arrow r_{2}\oplus H(s_{2})$
$7\mathrm{J}_{2}arrow(_{1}\mathrm{s}_{2}||t_{2})^{\epsilon}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d} N$
$y$ $\not\in-\mathrm{C}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{A}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{t}N,k$ $(v_{1}, v_{2})$
return $y$
Algorithm $D_{\mathrm{s}k}^{GH}!(y)$
$\prime U$ $arrow y\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d} N$
$s$ $\mapsto[\mathrm{u}^{d}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d} N]^{n+k_{1}}\}$
. $t$ $arrow[lu^{d}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d} N]_{k_{\mathrm{O}}}$
$T$ $arrow t$ ffi $H(s)$
$g\mathrm{j}$ $\mapsto[s\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}G(r)]$”; $p\mapsto[s\oplus G(r)]_{k_{1}}$
if $(p=\mathrm{D}^{k_{1}})\Sigma$ $\mapsto x$ else $\underline{r}arrow[perp]$
return 2
4.3 Analysis
We compare the four schemes with sampling
twice, repeating, RSACD, and expanding.
4.3.1 Security
Bellare, Boldyreva, Desai, and Pointcheval [1]
proved that the scheme with repeating (RSA-RAEP)
is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2 and IK-CCA
in the random oracle model assuming RSA is $\theta-$
partial one-way for $\theta>0.5$ . Hayashi, Okamoto,
and Tanaka [6] proved that the encryption sche me
with RSACD is also secure in the sense of IND-
CCA2 and IK-CCA in the random oracle model
assuming RSACD is&-partial one-way for $\theta>$ $0.5$
In order to prove that the scheme with sampling
twice is secure in the sense of IK-CCA, we need the
restriction as follows.
Since if $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{j}$ is aciphertext of $m$ for $pk$ $=(N_{1}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{i}, h)$
and $c<$ $2^{k}-N$ then $c+N$ is aiso aciphertext
of $m$ , the adversary can ask $c$ $+N_{0}$ to decryption
oracle $D_{Bk_{0}}$ where $\zeta \mathrm{j}$ is achallenge ciphertext such
that $\mathrm{c}<$ $2^{k}-N_{0}$ and $pk_{0}=(N_{0}, e_{0}, k)_{1}$ and if the
answer of $\Pi\supset_{\mathrm{s}h_{0}}$ is $m$ , then the adversary can know
that $\mathrm{c}$ was encrypted with $pk_{0}$ .
To prevent this attack, we add some natural re-
striction to the adversaries in the definitions of
IK-CCA, That is, it is mandated that the adver-
sary never queries either $c’\in[0, 2^{k})$ such that
as
Figure 2: The comparison of the encryption schemes
$c’=c$ (mod $N_{0}$ ) to $D_{\mathrm{s}h:0}$ or $c’\in[\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{f}}2^{k}$ ) such that
$c’=c(\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d} N_{1}\rangle$ to $l\mathrm{J}_{\mathrm{s}k_{1}}$ .
Similarly, in order to prove that the scheme with
sampling twice is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2,
we need the same restriction. That is, in the def-
inition of IND-CCA2, it is mandated that the ad-
versary never queries $c’\in[0,2^{k})$ such that $c’=$
$\mathrm{c}$ $(\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d} N)$ to $l\mathit{3}_{\mathrm{s}k}$ .
We think these restrictions are natural and rea-
sonable. Actually, in the case of undeniable and
confirmer signature schemes, Galbraith and Mao [5]
defined the anonymity on undeniable and confirmer
signature schemes with the above restriction.
If we add these restrictions then we can prove
that the scheme with sampling twice is secure in
the sense of IK-CCA in the random oracle model
assuming RSA is $\theta$-partial one-way for $\theta>0.5$ .
More precisely, we can prove the following the0-
$\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}$ .
Theorem 2. For any $\mathrm{f}ld^{t}u\mathbb{E}i\Gamma sary$ $A$ attacking the
anonymity of our scheme II under the adaptive
$ch\mathrm{o}s\mathrm{t}\exists n$-ciphertext attack, and making at most $q_{\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}}$
$decrypti\mathit{0}\Gamma 1$ oracle quertes, $q_{\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}}$ $G$ oracle queries,
fiTLd qhash $H$ oracle quer $is$, $t\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{i}/\cdot \mathrm{E}\mathrm{i}$ $e\mathrm{n}2sts$ $a\mathrm{i}$ El-parttal
$\dot{\mathrm{g}}n7\mathrm{J}ert\mathrm{i}_{71}gaad?1ersaaryEforfhatfor\mathrm{f}\mathrm{J}nykL_{0}^{\mathrm{B}}(k),k_{1}(k),$ $t \mathrm{b}\iota\}ndd\theta=e\mathrm{R}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{A}\frac{\mathrm{h}-\mathrm{L}-[\mathrm{k}]f\iota \mathrm{I}m_{0}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{f}y_{J}}{k}$
,
such
$\mathrm{A}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{v}_{\Pi,A}^{j\mathrm{k}- \mathrm{c}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}}(k)$ $\leq\frac{\mathrm{s}_{q\mathrm{I}1\mathrm{A}\mathrm{B}\mathrm{I}_{1}}}{[1-\epsilon_{1}][1-\epsilon_{2}\}[1-\epsilon \mathrm{a}]}\cdot \mathrm{A}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{v}_{\mathrm{R}5\mathrm{A},B}^{\theta-\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}-\mathrm{f}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}}(\overline{h.})$
$+q_{\mathrm{g}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{n}}\cdot q_{\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{h}}$
. $(1 -\in_{\mathrm{B}})^{-1}2^{-\#;+2}$
where $\epsilon_{1}=\frac{1}{2},$ $\in \mathrm{z}$ $= \frac{2}{2^{\mathrm{k}/2-3}-1}$ , $\epsilon_{3}=\frac{2q_{\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}^{\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}}}}{2^{k_{\mathrm{l}}}}+\frac{\mathrm{z}_{q\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{h}}}{2^{\mathrm{b}-h_{\mathrm{Q}}}}+$
$\frac{2q_{\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{G}\mathrm{n}}+q_{\mathrm{d}\mathrm{G}\mathrm{C}}+\mathrm{Z}q_{\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{E}\mathrm{f}1}}q_{\mathrm{d}_{\mathrm{L}^{\mathrm{b}}\mathrm{G}}}}{\underline{\mathrm{q}}\mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{O}}}$, and the running time of $B$ zs
that of $d4$ plus $q_{\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}’ 1}$ . qhash $\cdot$ $\square (k^{3})$ .
Noticing that the range of valid ciphertexts changes,
the proof is similar to that for RSA-RAEP and
available in the full version [7].
We can also prove that the scheme with sam-
pling twice is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2
in the random oracle model assuming RSA is 0-
partial one-way for $\theta>$ $05$ . More precisely, we
can prove that if there exists aCCA2-adversary
$A=(A_{1\mathrm{p}}A_{2})$ attacking indistinguishability of our
scheme with advantage $\epsilon_{1}$ then there exists aCCA2-
adversary $B$ $=(E_{1\mathrm{l}}E_{2})$ attacking indistinguisha-
bility of RSA-OAEP with advantage $\epsilon/2$ We can
struct $B$ as follows.
1. $E_{1}$ gets $pk$ and passes it to $A_{1}$ . $E_{1}$ gets
( $m_{01}m_{1}$ , si) which is an output of $A_{1}$ , and
$E_{1}$ outputs it.
2. $E_{2}$ gets achallenge ciphertext $y$ and sets
$y’arrow y$ % $tN$ where $t$ $arrow R\{0,1\}$ . If $y’\geq 2^{k}$
then E2 outputs Fail and halts; otherwise $E_{2}$
passes ( $y’1$ si) to $A_{2}$ . $E_{\mathrm{Z}}$ gets $d\in\{0_{1}1\}$ which
is an output of A2, and $E_{2}$ outputs it.
If $B$ does not output Fail, 11 outputs correctly with
advantage $\epsilon$ . Since $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}$ [$E$ outputs Fai]$]<$ $1/2_{\mathrm{I}}$ the
advantage of $B$ is greater than $\epsilon/2$ .
4.3.2 Efficiency
We show the number of modular exponentia-
tions to encrypt, the number of modular exponen-
tiations to decrypt, the size of ciphertexts, and the
number of random bits to encrypt in Figure 2. We
assume that $N$ is uniformly distributed in $(2^{k-1},2^{h})$ .
5Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have proposed anew technique
for obtaining the anonymity property of RSA-based
cryptosystems, which we call “sampling twice.”
By applying the sampling twice technique, we have
constructed the schemes for encryption, undeni-
able and confirmer signature, and ring signature
For the comparison of the undeniable ancl can
firmer signature schemes, in this paper, we only
present the number of modular exponentiations to
sign, the number of computation of square root,
the size of signatures, and the number of random
bits to sign in Figure 3. We assume that $N$ is
uniformly distributed in $(2^{\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{i}}-1},$ $2^{h}.\}$ .
For ring signature, we present the number of
modular exponentiations to sign, the number of
modullr $\mathrm{r}$ exponentiations to verify, the size of sig-
natures, and the number of random bits to sign in
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Figure 3 $\cdot$ The comparison of the undeniable and confirmer signature schemes
$\Xi$ampling Twice $\mathrm{E}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}_{1}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ $[\mathrm{B}\dot{\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}}$ RSACD [6] $\mathrm{R}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{p}\xi \mathrm{i}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$
$\#$ of nlOd. $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}$ . to sign
$\{\mathrm{a}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}/\mathrm{w}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{l}.\mathrm{E}\mathrm{t}]$
$2r/2r$ $?^{\sim}/T$ $1.5r/2r$ $1.5r/kr$.
$\#$ of $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}$ . $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}$ . $\not\subset 0$ $\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}.\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{v}\cup$
$\{\mathrm{a}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}/\mathrm{r}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}]$
$r/r$ $r/T$ $1.5\tau/Er$ $r/T$
size $\mathfrak{o}\mathrm{f}$ signatulBs $[3\tau+1\}b+r$ $\{3\tau+1]h^{\Lambda}+160[\#. +1\}$ $[3r+1]k$ {$3r+1]k$ –1
$\#$ cf ralldom bitb to sign
{aveI $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}/\mathrm{W}\mathrm{O}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{t}$]
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Figure 4: The comparison of the ring signature schemes $(|N_{\mathrm{i}}|\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} \ )$
Figure 4. We assume that each $N_{\mathrm{i}}$ is unifo rmly
distributed in $(2_{\mathrm{J}}^{k-1}2^{h})$ .
Due to lack of space, $\det \mathrm{a}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{s}$ have been omitted
from this paper. See the full version [7].
In our analysis, we have observed that the scheme
with sampling twice is efficient with respect to the
sizes of ciphertexts and signatures, the computa-
tional costs to decrypt ciphertexts and to verify
signatures in the average and worst cases, anci the
computational costs to encrypt messages and to
sign messages in the worst case.
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